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            *CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND ABORTION: A MODERN DEFENSE*

                          by Francis J. Beckwith

    Morally reflective people have wrestled with the question of
whether civil disobedience is ever morally justified, and if so,
under what circumstances?[1] Throughout history there have been
cases of civil disobedience that seem morally justified, including:
the early Christian church's refusal to obey the government's
command not to preach the gospel (Acts 4); Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s refusal to obey racially discriminating laws;[2] and
Christians' violation of religiously oppressive laws when smuggling
Bibles and doing missionary work.

    Many pro-lifers who peacefully block abortion clinics defend
civil disobedience from a theological/biblical perspective, and
some of their critics thoughtfully argue against them from that
perspective as well. I maintain that pro-lifers have a _right_ to
violate antitrespassing laws in order to rescue unborn children. I
do not contend, however, that pro-lifers have a moral _obligation_
to do so, since it would be physically impossible as well as entail
significant personal risk to save every oppressed person -- born or
unborn -- by breaking the law.[3] Moreover, I believe that
prudential considerations -- those having to do with whether
rescuing as a strategy will do greater harm than good in changing
minds and laws -- may well lead pro-lifers to avoid civil
disobedience altogether during this stage of the abortion
controversy in North America.

    My position differs from that of Randall Terry, the founder of
Operation Rescue (OR), the pro-life group that has given high
visibility to pro-life civil disobedience. Terry argues that
Christians are obligated to violate the law.[4] My position also
differs from certain pro-life critics of Terry, such as Norman
Geisler and John and Paul Feinberg, who argue that as the current
law exists people have _no right_ to engage in pro-life civil
disobedience.[5]

--------

*Henry David Thoreau* (1817-1862) published a lecture entitled
"Resistance to Civil Government" in 1849. He argued that there is
a higher law than the civil law, and that the higher law must be
obeyed even if a penalty ensues. Thoreau's "resistance" pertained
to the government's endorsement of slavery and its "imperialist
war" against Mexico.

*Mahatma Gandhi* (1869-1948) developed the practice of nonviolent
civil disobedience which ultimately forced Great Britain to grant
independence to India in 1947.

*Martin Luther King, Jr.* (1929-1968) was America's most visible
civil rights leader from 1955 until his assassination in April,
1968 in Memphis, Tennessee. He advocated Ghandian nonviolent civil
disobedience as a means of bringing about social change. He was
awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1964.

*Randall Terry* is the founder and director of Operation Rescue, a
nationally organized coalition of pro-life pastors and laypeople
that stages sit-ins around abortion clinics in an attempt to save
the lives of unborn children. Terry and his supporters believe
Christians are _obligated_ to engage in nonviolent civil
disobedience as a means of putting an end to abortion.

----------


DEFENDING PRO-LIFE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

    There are many biblical instances of divinely approved civil
disobedience.[6] In Exodus 1:15-22 Pharaoh commanded the midwives
to slay every male Hebrew baby. But Hebrew midwives Shiprah and
Puah "feared God and did not do what the king of Egypt had told
them to do; they let the boys live" (v. 17, NIV). As a result "God
was kind to the midwives and the people increased and became even
more numerous. And because the midwives feared God, he gave them
families of their own" (vv. 20-21).

    In 1 Kings 18:4 wicked queen Jezebel "was killing off the
LORD's prophets." In defiance of her orders the prophet Obadiah
"had taken a hundred prophets and hidden them in two caves...and
had supplied them with food and water" (v. 4). Although Scripture
does not explicitly approve of Obadiah's act, the context and
manner of the Bible's presentation implies that God condoned it
(_see_ vv. 13-15).

    In Joshua 2:1-14 Rahab saved the lives of two Hebrew spies by
hiding them from soldiers who were searching for them. Randy Alcorn
points out that "the spies had no legal right to be in Jericho,
while the soldiers had every legal right to apprehend them."[7]
Other instances of divinely approved civil disobedience can be
found in Exodus 5, Daniel 3 and 6, Acts 4, and Revelation 12-13.

    These and other biblical cases of justified civil disobedience
seem to have the following factors in common: (1) the state
commands the believer to do something contrary to the Word of God;
(2) the command is disobeyed; and (3) there is explicit or implicit
divine approval of the refusal to obey the state.

    Since the Bible permits or commands Christians to disobey the
law only when the state _commands_ them to do evil or not to do
good (Acts 5:28-29), some opponents argue that pro-life civil
disobedience is wrong because the state does not compel pro-life
Christians to abort _their_ unborn children or to participate in
abortions. This argument does not succeed for at least two reasons.

    First, by forbidding the rescuers to exercise Christ's command
to "love your neighbor as yourself" (Matt. 22:39), the government
is in fact compelling pro-life Christians to do evil (or at least
not to do good). Pro-life Christians believe the unborn child _is_
their neighbor and to rescue that child from certain death is a
good thing.

    Second, this objection fails if one believes that those who
broke the law when hiding Jews from the Holocaust did a good thing.
Based on the reasoning of those who oppose pro-life civil
disobedience, those who rescued Jews from the Holocaust were wrong
since the state was not compelling most of them to kill a Jew or to
work in a concentration camp.


OBJECTIONS

    To better understand my view, consider a few objections to
pro-life civil disobedience. Since it is impossible in the allotted
space to address every objection in the abortion literature,[8] I
have chosen three that are the most forceful and popular.

    *Objection 1:* _The tactics of certain groups involved in civil
disobedience will lead to violence against clinics and doctors,
since anything can be justified to "save lives."_

    There are at least three problems with this argument. First,
this objection commits the "slippery-slope" fallacy. It occurs when
a person believes that if a certain thing is allowed, it will
eventually lead to something bad or far worse. For example, if I
were to argue that elementary schools should not ban fifth-graders
from reading hard-core pornography because it would eventually lead
to banning good literature, I would be committing the
slippery-slope fallacy. I would be making the mistake of assuming
that there are no distinctions between forms of literature and that
we cannot make rational judgments about such matters.

    When arguing against the rescuer, the person who commits this
fallacy mistakenly assumes that because something _might_ lead to
something bad or far worse, it _must_ lead to something bad or far
worse. If this reasoning were correct, however, then no action
would ever be justified, since it is possible that any action
_might_ (in a broad logical sense) lead to something that is
undesirable.

    This objection incorrectly assumes that the pro-lifer cannot
make distinctions between degrees of law-breaking, and that once
one allows for peaceful civil disobedience, revolution must follow.
The opponent to pro-life civil disobedience has not proven that the
civilly disobedient pro-lifer is incapable of providing compelling
reasons not to employ violence.[9]

    Second, this objection apparently assumes that some rescuers
may believe that the _end_ (saving unborn children) justifies the
_means_ (including violence), but this assumption seems
unwarranted. The rescuers' view is simply that the command to save
lives is greater than the command not to trespass. Therefore, it is
not necessarily true that the rescuers believe they have the option
of using violence whenever they think it may achieve their end.

    For example, AIDS activists may believe it is their duty to
stop the spread of AIDS. But it would not follow that they would be
required to kill every person who is currently diagnosed with HIV
or AIDS, even though that would achieve their ends. AIDS activists
and pro-life activists do not hold their positions in a moral
vacuum; both groups hold to certain other values (i.e., respect for
life, the social order, laws, and so forth) that also play a part
in their moral decision-making.

    Third, even if the rescuers' position were consistent with the
use of violence, this would not mean a rescuer would be morally
_required_ to engage in such activity. That is to say, rescuers
could grant to their objector that they are morally justified in
blowing up a clinic (if they are certain beyond a reasonable doubt
that no innocent persons would be harmed) as well as attacking a
physician who is about to, or is in the process of, killing an
unborn child. Rescuers, however, could argue that out of prudential
judgment there is no reason to resort to such tactics. Simply
because something is morally permissible does not mean it is
prudent to do it. Just because I _can_ do something does not mean
I _must_ do it. Consequently, even if the use of force were morally
justified, prudential judgment indicates that in the current stage
of the abortion debate it would be severely counterproductive.

    *Objection 2:* _Since spiritual death is worse than physical
death, rescuers should also block the entrances to churches that
lead people to spiritual death._

    Problems with this objection can best be illustrated by the
following example: Suppose one had to choose between stopping one
of the following two fathers. Father A is taking his son to the
woodshed to kill him with a 44-magnum handgun, but only after an
hour of torturing him by covering his body with battery acid.
Father B is taking his son to the First Church of the False God,
where they will attend Sunday service and return home. Even though
spiritual death is ultimately worse than physical death, it seems
obvious that the rational person would choose to stop Father A,
based on two considerations.

    First, physical death and spiritual death are fundamentally
different. Just as in the case of Father A, the physical death in
abortion is inflicted on someone _by another_ and is irreversible.
By contrast, spiritual death is _self_-inflicted (people _choose_
to reject God) and can be reversible prior to physical death.

    Second, one prevents physical death differently than one
prevents spiritual death. One cannot prevent the spiritual death of
another by blocking the entrances to churches. People choose to
reject the Lord apart from whether or not they will enter a
building. One can only hope to prevent the spiritual death of
others by telling them the truth about the Lord and praying for
them. Consequently, the child who is led to a false church by his
or her parent will ultimately have the opportunity to make a choice
for himself or herself after reaching the age of accountability. On
the other hand, one can prevent an abortion (physical death) by
blocking the entrances to an abortion clinic.

    *Objection 3:* _Rescuing makes the pro-life movement look bad
and divides the movement._

    This is a prudential judgment, not a moral argument. Rescuing
may hurt the pro-life movement in terms of popularity and group
unity, but it may still be morally justified. Prudential judgments
and considerations should never be underestimated, for they are
important to political strategy. But they are not decisive in moral
judgment. For example, just as giving money to a homeless person
may be imprudent (that person may buy whiskey), rescuing may be
imprudent as well (it may undermine the long-term political goals
of the pro-life movement). Yet both acts may be morally
permissible.[10]


CONCLUSION

    It seems that pro-life civil disobedience is morally justified
from a biblical perspective. When we look at the Bible, we find
that it allows for the violation of a law when -- whether directly
or indirectly -- it prohibits one from obeying a command of God.
Since pro-life Christians are required by the enforcement of
trespassing laws not to love their unborn neighbors, the law
indirectly commands Christians not to obey Jesus' command to love
one's neighbor as oneself. Meanwhile, the objections to this view
are not compelling. In addition, since pro-life civil disobedience
is not morally obligatory, the question confronting the pro-life
movement is whether it is a prudent thing to do. The leadership of
those groups that engage in pro-life civil disobedience must answer
this serious and important question.


            *CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND ABORTION: AN OPPOSING VIEW*

                             by Paul Feinberg

    The apostle Paul said that a God-ordained duty of human civil
governments is to reward those who do good and punish evildoers
(Rom. 13:1-7). When governments fulfill their duty, it should be
easy for Christians to support them. When civil authorities fail in
this duty, however, Christians find themselves faced with a crisis
of conscience. This is particularly the case when a government
grants its citizens a legal right to do something immoral.

    Christians have wrestled with this problem throughout church
history, and unfortunately they have not always come to agreement
on what the duty of a disciple of Christ should be. Therefore, it
should not surprise us that Christians do not agree on what should
be done concerning the liberal abortion laws that are presently in
place in North America.

    I shall argue for a position that has two elements to it.
First, civil disobedience is not always wrong. Cases clearly exist
in which it is our duty to disobey the demands of our government.
Second, however, conditions that obligate Christians to acts of
civil disobedience _do not presently exist_ in North America with
respect to the abortion laws.


DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS

    To understand my position it is necessary to give some
important definitions and make some critical distinctions. First,
not all forms of protest against a governments actions require
civil disobedience. In fact, means of protesting do exist _within_
the laws of the land. What characterizes civil disobedience is that
it involves breaking a law passed by the government.

    Second, it is important to see that civil disobedience takes
two forms. Citizens may demonstrate their disagreement with certain
laws by taking _violent_ action. Actions of this sort may result in
personal injury, even death, and/or the destruction of property as
in the bombing or arson of abortion clinics. Citizens may also show
their displeasure with laws by engaging in _nonviolent_ action. In
the civil rights struggle, African Americans refused to obey a law
that allowed them to sit only at the rear of buses. In the fight to
stop abortions, many pro-lifers also engage in nonviolent action by
blocking the entrances to abortion clinics to prevent the death of
babies.

    There is another important distinction related to civil
disobedience. One may disobey a law _directly_ or _indirectly._
When civil disobedience is direct, there is typically a law which,
if obeyed, would require one to do something immoral. Imagine a law
that required one to commit adultery with a neighbor's wife. Direct
civil disobedience would require that one disobey this law by
refusing to become sexually involved with the neighbor's wife.

    Whereas _direct_ civil disobedience involves the breaking of a
law when it compels _me_ to sin or do evil, _indirect_ civil
disobedience occurs when the law allows _someone else_ to sin, and
_we_ break a law or some laws to protest what they are doing. To
protest a law's permission of others to do what is immoral, we must
break other laws that are only indirectly related to this law in an
effort to prevent others from exercising their legal right. In the
case of abortion, this means the breaking of trespassing laws and
laws that govern private property. _Good_ laws must be broken to
protest _bad_ or immoral laws in indirect civil disobedience.


A DEFENSE OF THE NEGATIVE VIEW

    Civil disobedience is not always wrong. It's difficult to see,
however, where Scripture or reason permits individuals to disobey
immoral laws _by violent acts._ The use of the sword is placed in
the hands of civil government, not individuals. Therefore, the
murder of doctors or support staff at abortion clinics is morally
wrong. Nor is it helpful to attempt to soften the immorality of
such acts by pointing out the immorality of abortion. Those who
destroy innocent life in the womb _and_ those who take justice into
their own hands through violence are _both wrong._

    On the other hand, nonviolent civil disobedience is sometimes
justified. God does not require blind obedience to our governments.
In fact, when government requires that I do something evil or
immoral, I am obligated to disobey that law.

    Many such examples appear in the Bible. The midwives disobeyed
Pharaoh's order to kill all the Hebrew baby boys (Exod. 1:15-22).
Rahab lied to protect the Jewish spies who reconnoitered Canaan
(Josh. 2:1-14). Daniel's three friends disobeyed Nebuchadnezzar's
command that everyone should fall down and worship a pagan image on
the plain of Dura (Dan. 3:1-18). Peter and John refused to cease
preaching the gospel, saying it is better to obey God than man
(Acts 5:29). Each case involved nonviolent direct civil
disobedience.

    Therefore, I think one would be justified in disobeying any law
that required one to have an abortion. Repeatedly there are reports
from the People's Republic of China that families are allowed only
one child. If a woman gets pregnant again, the government demands
that the fetus be aborted. In this case I think the woman would be
justified in disobeying the law since it demands that she do
something sinful.

    By contrast, I do not think the conditions that justify civil
disobedience are present in North America at this time. No law
requires one to have an abortion. Laws only permit those who desire
to have an abortion to do so. Since these laws permit others to do
something that is immoral and wrong, the only nonviolent act of
civil disobedience one can perform requires the breaking of good
laws to protest laws that are immoral. For instance, one could
block entrances to abortion clinics. Or one might try to change a
woman's mind about having an abortion by shouting arguments at her
or even calling her names -- actions she most likely would consider
to be harassment. In my opinion, then, the _only_ act of civil
disobedience one can perform against the law as presently
constituted in North America is to _indirectly_ disobey it, and I
see no justification for that.

    Before I turn to the justification for my view, let me guard it
from some common misconceptions. My position in no way entails the
belief that laws that permit others to do immoral acts are right or
moral. Laws that are wrong and immoral should be repealed as
quickly as possible. Nor do I excuse the guilt of those who act on
such laws. They have sinned in the exercise of their freedom, and
they are guilty before God.

    Furthermore, my view does not release me from the obligation to
protest the evil that is occurring. In fact, my obligation is to
protest _within the limits of the law._ In democracies like those
in North America, possible courses of action are many and varied.
For instance, we can write about and speak out against abortion. We
can support pro-life candidates. God may even call some of us to
run for public office to address this ill. Crisis pregnancy
agencies are another way we can protest the sin of abortion. I do
not praise quiescence and passivity to evil.

    The reasons for holding that civil disobedience is not always
wrong, but that it is not justified at present in North America,
are as follows:

    (1) Christians are called to obey civil authority. Though
believers in New Testament times lived under pagan civil rules,
they were commanded to obey their civil magistrates. Jesus told His
disciples that they were to render to Caesar the things that were
Caesar's (Matt. 22:21). They were even to pay their taxes -- taxes
that were most certainly used in ways not in keeping with Christian
morality (Rom. 13:7). Paul said Christians are to submit to their
rulers (Titus 3:1). Peter concurred when he wrote that we are to
submit to _every_ authority instituted among men (1 Pet. 2:13).
This includes both the king and lesser officials (1 Pet. 2:17).

    Again, however, the Bible does not require blind obedience to
the government. When the government demands that we do what is
expressly prohibited in Scripture, we must follow God rather than
man. We are _then_ obligated to directly disobey that command.
However, it is difficult for me to see how Christians follow the
commands of Scripture when they disobey good laws because they do
not like _other_ laws that are immoral but that do not obligate
them to do evil.

    (2) The cases of civil disobedience presented approvingly in
the Bible always involved nonviolent direct civil disobedience. In
each example a demand is made on individuals that requires _their_
disobedience to God. They disobey _that_ demand. In no case is
there an example of indirect civil disobedience; nowhere is there
anything that warrants protest against moral evils that includes
the breaking of good laws.

    (3) God has not given individuals the duty or right to prevent
others from doing what is wrong or immoral. God has given civil
governments the duty of establishing a just and moral society. But
even that has limits. While God has created a universe that is
governed by moral absolutes, He has granted His creatures the
freedom and ability to disobey Him (e.g., murder, lying, adultery),
even though He could have prevented those sins.

    Civil authorities are established to circumscribe evil. Even
when the laws are moral and just, they do not always succeed.
People break the law. It is surely more serious when the government
is party to the evil committed, but government is ultimately
accountable to God. Let us not forget that He will set things in
order in the end. Nowhere, however, is there a duty imposed on
individuals to protest the evils of the civil authority that
includes the breaking of good laws. Therefore, I do not see that
civil disobedience is even permissible to prevent others from
having abortions.

    (4) Even if it were morally permissible, civil disobedience is
prudentially inadvisable. That is, whether we grant that one may or
may not protest liberal abortion laws by breaking good laws, it is
simply not wise to do so. The two most commonly heard prudential
arguments are that civil disobedience saves the lives of unborn
babies and that in the long run it will bring about the pro-lifers'
goals. Let us examine these arguments.

    Does civil disobedience really save lives? Whatever may happen
in the long run, so it is argued, it will help the baby that is
scheduled for abortion _today._ To shut down a clinic today saves
the lives of any babies that were to be aborted at that clinic
today. Moreover, abortion rates go down in that area for a
reasonable period of time.

    Arguments of this sort are difficult to evaluate. It is true
that no babies are aborted at a closed clinic. However, is there
really a decline in abortions? Could it be that women simply go to
an area where there is no protest and have an abortion? How can one
be sure that the reason a woman decides against an abortion is the
closing of a clinic? More to the point, how can we be sure that
some women who are initially neutral on abortion do not become so
upset by the actions of pro-lifers that at some point they either
have an abortion themselves or come to support access to it for
others? It must be remembered that we are not simply trying to save
the life of a baby, we are trying to convince and, in some cases,
change the ideas some people have about abortion.

    Will civil disobedience bring about pro-life goals? Some argue
that it will bring the issue of abortion to the attention of the
public, and the arrest of protesters will force the courts to deal
with the issue. All of this, it is argued, will result in the
limiting or elimination of abortion. There is no question that
civil disobedience will bring the matter of abortion to the
public's attention. It is not clear, however, that it will result
in the pro-lifers' desired end. Will those who fall in the middle
of this debate -- those who are undecided on the matter -- be moved
to the pro-life side by their perception of such tactics? Or will
it result in the reinforcement of negative stereotypes of the
pro-life movement?

    Furthermore, I am concerned about a number of other
consequences of those who practice civil disobedience. Will it
create a climate where those who are at the fringes of the pro-life
movement feel justified in taking violent action, like bombing
clinics and killing doctors? And as more and more pro-lifers are
arrested, how will the overload on the court system be handled? Our
court and prison systems are _already_ overloaded. To aggravate
that problem is a serious matter. There is definitely the
possibility that those guilty of more serious crimes and who
constitute a more imminent danger to society will have to be
released.

    Finally, does the breaking of good laws foster disrespect for
the rule of law and ultimately raise the specter of anarchy? One
cannot say with certainty, but it does raise this troubling
prospect.


*BECKWITH'S REBUTTAL TO FEINBERG*

    I agree with much of what my friend Paul Feinberg has said. I
believe he is correct in saying that (1) biblically, civil
disobedience is justified in some circumstances and not in others;
(2) the Christian has an obligation to obey the laws of the state
except when those laws require that one directly violate biblical
norms; and (3) even if nonviolent civil disobedience is morally
permissible, one must question whether the activity is prudent.

    I believe, however, that we have two points of contention: (1)
Feinberg stresses abortion as a sin performed by the mother,
whereas I stress abortion as an evil against her unborn child; and
(2) Feinberg seems to be arguing that one may violate only evil
laws, whereas I believe it is permissible to violate a "good" law
(trespassing law) if used in an evil way.


THE UNBORN CHILD AS VICTIM

    The first contention is evident in Feinberg's claim that "one
would be justified in disobeying any law that required one to have
an abortion...," but "no law requires one to have an abortion. Laws
only permit those who desire to have an abortion to do so."
Therefore, "the only nonviolent act of civil disobedience one can
perform...is to _indirectly_ disobey them, and I see no
justification for that."

    The pro-life objection to abortion, however, is not that it is
merely an immoral act performed by a moral agent (the pregnant
woman), but rather, it is an act of unjustified homicide against an
innocent, vulnerable, and defenseless human person by means of
crushing, dismembering, suffocating, and/or burning. Consequently,
it is wrong to characterize pro-life civil disobedience as merely
trying to prevent a fellow citizen from performing an immoral act.
Indeed, it is an attempt to rescue innocent human persons from a
brutal and morally unjustified execution. Feinberg's stress on the
mother's sin rather than on the victimization of her unborn child
skews the nature of pro-life civil disobedience.


VIOLATING GOOD LAWS

    Feinberg also argues that the Christian is permitted to break
only laws that directly require one to violate a biblical norm.
Laws that do not directly require the Christian to do evil should
not be violated. I believe this argument is flawed.

    First, Jesus commanded us to "love your neighbor as yourself"
(Luke 10:27b). The government, however, by forbidding Christians to
save the lives of the unborn, is telling them not to love their
neighbor as themselves. Doesn't this law violate a command of God?

    Suppose Feinberg replies, "The government is merely forbidding
pro-lifers from disobeying trespassing laws. It is not telling them
not to love their neighbor." But isn't this more insidious than a
law that forbids them from loving the unborn by saving their lives?
Trespassing laws are being used to force Christians to disobey a
command of God, just as perjury laws were used in Nazi Germany to
force those who hid Jews from certain death to tell the truth under
oath as to the Jews' whereabouts. Based on Feinberg's position, one
could characterize the situation in Nazi Germany this way: "The
government was just forbidding its citizens to disobey good perjury
laws but not directly forbidding them to rescue Jews."
Consequently, according to this reasoning, those who rescued Jews
from the Holocaust were wrong, since the state was not compelling
most of them to directly kill a Jew.

    Second, how is one to evaluate whether a law is good or bad? Is
it how the statute is written and intended by a legislator? Or is
it how the statute is applied in practice by law enforcement, the
courts, and the executive branch? It seems that Feinberg thinks it
is the legislative branch's written text and not its application
that is the arbiter in morally evaluating a law. But he has
provided no reason to believe _why_ that is the case.

    Even though Feinberg and I disagree over the issue of when
civil disobedience is justified, what we hold in common is far more
important: abortion ought to be illegal since it is unjustified
homicide. I applaud Feinberg's important work in this area.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
*Francis J. Beckwith,* Ph.D., is Lecturer of Philosophy at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, as well as Professor at Large,
Simon Greenleaf University (Anaheim, CA) and Senior Research
Fellow, Nevada Policy Research Institute. His books include
_Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion
Rights_ (Baker, 1993), _Matters of Life and Death: Calm Answers to
Tough Questions about Abortion and Euthanasia_ (Baker, 1991), and
_The Abortion Controversy: A Reader_ (Jones & Bartlett, 1994).
-------------------------------------------------------------------


*FEINBERG'S REBUTTAL TO BECKWITH*

    The discussion between Beckwith and myself demonstrates that a
variety of positions may be taken on the question of abortion and
civil disobedience. Actually, though, our views are quite close in
several respects. For instance, we agree that civil disobedience is
not _always_ wrong for the Christian; we agree that pro-lifers have
_no_ obligation to commit acts of civil disobedience; and we agree
that such acts are most likely imprudent in the struggle to save
lives today.

    There is, however, an important point of disagreement between
us. It is over the question of whether pro-lifers have a right to
commit acts of nonviolent civil disobedience to prevent others from
having abortions. Beckwith thinks they do; I disagree. In this
short reply, I will focus on the two arguments Beckwith offers for
his view.

    The first argument is drawn from biblical examples of civil
disobedience that are presented with divine approval (Exod.
1:15-22; 5; Josh. 2:1-14; 1 Kings 18:3-15; Dan. 3, 6; Acts 4; Rev.
12  13). In my judgment, however, none of these cases parallel what
pro-lifers are doing today. The biblical examples involve _direct_
civil disobedience. That is, believers are commanded by their
government to do something that disobeys God, and they refuse to
comply. None of these cases involve _indirect_ civil disobedience.
Nowhere is there an example of believers breaking good laws to
prevent others from doing wrongs permitted by their government.
Thus, I think this argument fails to prove its intended point.

    Beckwith's second argument at first seems to offer more
promise, but in the end it is equally flawed. He defends the right
to civil disobedience based on what might be called the Good
Samaritan principle, which requires that I love my neighbor as
myself. The unborn is my neighbor. To love him or her I must try to
save that life. Since the state is preventing me from following
God's command, I am justified in breaking the law so I may love my
neighbor.

    This argument fails in the end for these reasons:

    (1) While this argument tries to avoid the _direct/indirect_
distinction with respect to civil disobedience, it does not.
Disobedience is not directed against any law that requires me to do
anything. It is against good laws to protest laws that permit
others to do what is wrong.

    (2) Love for one's neighbor is a very general command. To be
followed, specific actions must be performed. Beckwith assumes that
breaking good laws to protest bad ones is a specific action that
falls under this general command. This argument, however, will not
convince anyone who does not agree with this assumption. Moreover,
this argument focuses quite narrowly on the unborn child who is
about to be aborted. It does not take into account that such acts
_may_ lead to an increased disregard for the law or even anarchy.
It does not take into account that such actions _may_ lead to
overcrowding in our prisons and the early release of a dangerous
criminal who may murder my neighbor. Therefore, in determining what
constitutes loving one's neighbor, _we cannot just attend to the
unborn._ We must take into account a broader group of people.

    (3) The _general_ command to love one's neighbor is used to
disobey the _specific_ command that we are to obey and submit to
civil authority. As I have said, I do not think this requires
uncritical or complete obedience. However, neither do I think it
authorizes actions that require the breaking of good laws so one
can protest or prevent others from exercising a right that their
government gives them and that is immoral.

    (4) I do not think my view prevents me from praising those who
hid Jews during the Holocaust. Beckwith's claim ignores the
direct/indirect distinction with regard to civil disobedience. The
Nazi government demanded that individuals turn in Jews for
deportation and probably death. They disobeyed that demand. Their
disobedience was _direct._ But would we think it morally
praiseworthy for someone who wanted to protect the Jews to break
into the houses of informers and detain them so they could not aid
the government?

    Let me close by reiterating two points. First, I do not believe
abortion is morally right. _It is a terrible wrong._ But it must be
fought in a morally justifiable way. Second, I am not saying we
have no obligation to oppose abortion. I have simply argued that
our opposition must be _within_ the law.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
*Paul Feinberg,* Th.D., is Professor of Biblical and Systematic
Theology at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. He is co-author of
_Ethics for a Brave New World_ (Crossway Books, 1993, with John S.
Feinberg) and _Introduction to Philosophy_ (with Norman Geisler).
-------------------------------------------------------------------


NOTES

 1 _See_ Randy Alcorn, _Is Rescuing Right?_ (Downers Grove, IL:
   InterVarsity Press, 1990); John Feinberg and Paul Feinberg,
   _Ethics in a Brave New World_ (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books,
   1993), 91-98; Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from the
   Birmingham Jail," _The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in
   Moral Philosophy,_ ed. James Rachels (New York: Random House,
   1989), 236-53; Randall Terry, _Operation Rescue_ (Springdale,
   PA: Whitaker, 1988); Ernest Van Den Haag, "The Dilemma of Civil
   Disobedience," _Philosophy: The Quest for Truth,_ ed. Louis P.
   Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989), 433-42; and John Rawls,
   "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," _The Right Thing to
   Do,_ 254-70.
 2 King.
 3 They are called _supererogatory acts_ -- acts in which one has
   a right to engage but not an obligation since they involve great
   personal risk. For more on this subject, _see_ Hadley Arkes,
   _First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals
   and Justice_ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986),
   288-308.
 4 Terry, 99-111.
 5 Norman L. Geisler, _Christian Ethics: Options and Issues_ (Grand
   Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989), 239-56; and Feinberg and
   Feinberg, 91-98.
 6 For an excellent overview of the biblical passages, _see_
   Alcorn, 4-56.
 7 _Ibid.,_ 42.
 8 Some of the strongest objections to pro-life civil disobedience
   can be found in Geisler, 239-56; and Feinberg and Feinberg,
   91-98.
 9 _See_ the recent symposium on this issue: "Killing Abortionists:
   A Symposium," _First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and
   Public Life_ (December 1994): 24-31.
10 John and Paul Feinberg do an excellent job of weighing these
   prudential considerations in _Ethics in a Brave New World,_
   97-98.

-------------

End of document, CRJ0197A.TXT (original CRI file name),
"Operation Rescue: Debating the Ethics of Civil Disobedience. Two
Opposing Views"
release A, July 20, 1995
R. Poll, CRI

(A special note of thanks to Bob and Pat Hunter for their help in
the preparation of this ASCII file for BBS circulation.)

-----------------------------------------------------------------

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